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dismiss its 1995 and 1996 applications with prejudice. The irrigation
companies and Boulder argued the water court should only dismiss
the applications if it would also order GASP to pay the companies' and
Boulder's attorneys' fees associated with their opposition to GASP's
1995 and 1996 applications. The water court granted the motion to
dismiss, and ordered GASP to pay the requested attorneys' fees. GASP
appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court on the issue of attorneys'
fees, and the irrigation companies and Boulder cross-appealed the
Division One's failure to address their out-of-priority pumping claim.
Addressing the issue of attorneys' fees, the Colorado Supreme
Court looked to federal case law regarding the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the virtually identical provision in the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure. Based on federal authorities, the court held the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize the imposition of
attorneys' fees in cases dismissed with prejudice, except in cases of bad
faith. The court reasoned that if a plaintiff were subject to attorneys'
fees upon moving to dismiss its own claims, there would be little
incentive to dismiss such claims rather than pursuing litigation.
On the issue of the requested injunction, the court agreed with the
water court, finding the request outside the scope of the current
proceeding. Under Colorado law, statements of opposition filed
regarding the adjudication of water rights or conditional water rights
may only "set forth facts as to why the application should not be
granted or why it should be granted only in part or on certain
conditions." Boulder and the irrigation companies had requested an
injunction regarding GASP members' out-of-priority pumping-a
subject not at issue in the present case. Thus, the Colorado Supreme
Court reversed the water court's order imposing attorneys' fees, and
affirmed the water court's denial of the motion for injunction.
KatharineJ.Ellison

Vought v. Stucker Mesa Domestic Pipeline Co., 76 P.3d 906 (Colo.
2003) (affirming water court's decision that pipeline company satisfied
requirements for obtaining conditional water right decree prior in
time to absentee landowner).
The dispute in this case arose between Peter Vought ("Vought")
and Stucker Mesa Domestic Pipeline Company ("Stucker Mesa")
concerning which party gained an earlier appropriation date for the
right to use water from several springs located on Vought's property.
The Colorado Supreme Court held Stucker Mesa obtained an earlier
appropriation date because it satisfied all of the requirements to
obtain a conditional water right decree before Vought.
Vought, an absentee land owner, applied for a conditional water
right decree in the Division Four Water Court on October 23, 2000.
Vought stated he first intended to use several springs on his land for
domestic use in 1970; however, he did not act on that intent for
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another two decades. On October 22, 1996, Vought instructed his
foreman to clean up debris on a road that led to one of the springs.
Three years later, the same foreman spoke with an employee at the
Colorado Division of Water Resources about possibly applying for a
conditional water rights decree. In October 1999, Vought's foreman
claimed that he put stakes into the springs with the date "1999 Oct"
written on each one. Finally, in Fall of 2000, Vought's foreman dug
holes around one of the springs in order to improve the flow and
install equipment necessary to measure and increase the water flow.
Stucker Mesa, a non-profit organization that supplies water to local
establishments, experienced a shortage in its water supply, and after
inspecting the springs on Vought's land and establishing the global
positioning system ("GPS") location of the springs, also applied for a
conditional water right decree. The water court held Stucker Mesa
obtained an earlier appropriation date. Vought appealed the water
court's decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.
To obtain a conditional water right in Colorado, an applicant must
demonstrate compliance with two major requirements: the "first step"
test and the "can and will" requirement. The court stated that the
"first step" test requires that the appropriator satisfy two requirements:
showing intent to appropriate the water for a beneficial use, and
performance of an overt act that (1) manifests an intent to appropriate
the water, (2) demonstrates taking a substantial step toward applying
the water to a beneficial use, and (3) notifies interested parties of the
nature and extent of the proposed demand upon the water supply.
Applying these rules, the court found that Vought and Stucker
Mesa both satisfied all of the requirements in the "first step" for
obtaining a conditional water right decree; however, Stucker Mesa
satisfied the requirements earlier than Vought. The court noted that
Vought satisfied the first part of step one, an intent to appropriate
water, in 1970 when he first planned on appropriating water from the
springs for domestic use. The court found that Vought satisfied all
elements of the overt act requirement, but not until he filed the
application for a conditional water right.
Specifically, Vought
manifested his intent to appropriate the water in 1970; however, he
did not take a substantial step toward appropriating the water until his
foreman dug around the spring and installed pipes and a barrel in fall
of 2000. Furthermore, the court noted that Vought failed to notify any
interested parties of the demand upon the water supply until he filed
his application on October 23, 2000. Further, the court found the
foreman's actions of talking to an employee about possibly applying
for an appropriation as well as allegedly posting stakes in the springs
were insufficient to satisfy this final requirement. Therefore, the court
held that Vought did not satisfy all of the requirements of the "first
step" until October 23, 2000.
Addressing Stucker Mesa's application, the court found Stucker
Mesa satisfied the requirements of the "first step" test on October 6,
2000. Specifically, Stucker Mesa successfully completed the first two
prongs of the "first step" requirement when it fixed the GPS location

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

of the springs; however, like Vought, it failed to put others on notice
until it filed its application for a conditional water rights decree on
October 6, 2000. Therefore, the court held Stucker Mesa did not
satisfy all of the elements of the "first step" requirement until October
6, 2000.
The court then addressed the second step in obtaining a
conditional water right in Colorado, the "can and will" requirement.
The "can and will" test requires an applicant to prove that he or she
will not only diligently complete an appropriation, but also put water
to a beneficial use within a reasonable amount of time. Vought
challenged Stucker Mesa's ability to satisfy the "can and will"
requirement because he never gave the company a right of access onto
his property. However, since Stucker Mesa proved that it possessed the
need and the ability to construct the necessary equipment for water
appropriation, the court invoked the right of private condemnation,
which gives water rights owners a right-of-way through the lands which
lie between the point of diversion and point of use. Therefore, the
court held Stucker Mesa fulfilled the "can and will" test by invoking
the right of private condemnation over Vought's land.
Finally, Vought contended that the court should dismiss Stucker
Mesa's application due to Stucker Mesa's alleged trespass onto
Vought's land. However, the court found that there was no basis for
the trespass claim, and dismissed the argument. Thus, the Colorado
Supreme Court concluded that while Vought and Stucker Mesa both
satisfied all of the requirements for obtaining a conditional water right
decree for the springs, Stucker Mesa satisfied the requirements earlier
than Vought.
BretJohnson

CONNECTICUT
Rocque v. Biafore, No. CV000800791S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1323 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2003) (holding that property owners
who did not cause contamination are nonetheless strictly liable and
therefore subject to both injunctive and civil penalties under the
Connecticut Water Pollution Control Act for discharges of hazardous
materials from owner's property into state waters).
Arthur Rocque ("Rocque"), Commissioner of the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), sued Joseph
Biafore, Jr., Nicholas Biafore, and companies they owned and
controlled ("Biafore") for violations of the Connecticut Water
The six-count complaint alleged
Pollution Control Act ("Act").
for discharging
responsible
was
Biafore
property owner
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") without a permit into state waters
from their property located in Stratford, Connecticut ("site"). Rocque

